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Climate change, agricultural policy 
and poverty reduction – how much 
do we know?
P rojections suggest that, by the end of the 21
st century, climate change could have had 
substantial impact on agricultural production and thence on the scope for reducing poverty. 
This paper seeks to trace the likely impacts through changes in the quality of the physical 
asset base, access to assets, and impacts on grain production and on agricultural growth 
more generally. At moderate degrees of warming, impacts are likely to be negative in some regions, 
but positive in others, making it important to understand the possible implications for trade between 
the regions. The short term impacts of climate change, particularly changes in the frequency and 
severity of adverse weather events, remain uncertain, but their impacts on many developing countries 
are likely to be negative. There is likely to be time to make appropriate policy responses to some of 
the longer-term impacts.
Rachel Slater, Leo Peskett, Eva Ludi and David Brown1
Policy conclusions
Considerable uncertainty surrounds long-term patterns of climate change and their likely2 
impacts on agriculture. The prospects are that policy will have time to respond to some 
impacts, such as possible global decreases in crop production.
Shorter term shocks from increased climate variability might be experienced much sooner 
and are likely to be severe for tropical areas.
Both long- and short-term changes imply an increased need for more food trade 
between the OECD and rest of the world. Without this, food security in some regions 
may diminish.
Agricultural practices need to be incorporated into mitigation policies and programmes 
such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  This will promote the measurement 
of carbon balances in agriculture and the search for synergies between mitigation and 
adaptation in the sector. 
Increased scope for carbon trading may in some measure compensate for lost agricultural 
production potential in developing countries if these countries can access the carbon 
markets.
Conversely, if not carefully designed, mitigation policies such as biofuels and carbon 
markets are likely to further restrict access by the poor to productive resources, access 
which is already under threat from numerous development pressures on resources
Donors can help in mainstreaming policy responses to climate change into poverty 
reduction strategies and into other national development policies and programmes.
The “mainstreaming” of responses to climatic change into wider government policy 
will help in identifying which rights of the poor are under threat and in strengthening 
them. 
Donor assistance may usefully support developing country interests in international 
climate negotiations, and help governments to support both regulated and voluntary 
carbon markets.
Speciﬁc international funds for agricultural adaptation need to be identiﬁed that are 
additional to existing development assistance, possibly targeted towards viable export 
options, and if necessary earmarked for access by developing countries.
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Introduction
For present purposes, climate change is deﬁned as a process of 
global warming, in part attributable to the ‘greenhouse gases’ 
generated by human activity. Accompanying changes are likely to 
be both global, as with rising sea levels attributable to ice-melt, 
and local, such as changes in rainfall patterns. Responses to 
climate change can either seek to reduce the level or rate of change 
(mitigation) or manage its consequences (adaptation). We are 
concerned here with both types of response.
Agriculture currently accounts for 24% of world output, and uses 
40% of land area (FAO 2003). It is highly dependent on the climate 
and human dependence on agricultural livelihoods, particularly 
by the poor, is high, and so agriculture has been a focus of those 
modelling the impact of climate change on poverty. 
This paper reviews current knowledge about the relationships 
between agriculture and climate change, focusing on:
cereal crops – rice, wheat and maize make up 85% of world 
cereal exports, and are thought to be particularly sensitive to 
climate change (FAO 2003) 
four scenarios of future climate change derived from models 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
modelling studies used in the recent IPCC Working Group II 
Report (particularly Fischer et al 2002; Fischer et al 2005; Parry 
et al 2004; Parry et al 2005).
global climate changes, as these have more coverage in 
modelling studies, rather than regional or local changes.
Most models suggest that climate change will slow or reverse the 
poverty reducing impact of agriculture, with, by one estimate, 
some 600 million additional people at risk of hunger if temperature 
increases by over 3°C (Warren et al. 2006). But this has to be set 
against other changes in agriculture such as improvements in 
technology and changes in farming systems. Also, assumptions 
about population growth and food demand have a large inﬂuence 
on future projections (IPCC 2007).
Given the complex relationships between crops, atmospheric 
composition and temperature, combined with the complexities of 
world agricultural policies and trade, to make predictions about 
the future impacts of climate change on agriculture is fraught with 
difﬁculties. However, models based on the scenarios in Table 1 all 
suggest an increase in extreme events such as ﬂoods and droughts, 
even in the short term.
•
•
•
Global climate models
These seek to link predictions of future climates to potential impacts 
on crops.  There are ﬁve main elements to these processes:
Scenarios of greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions
Scenarios of greenhouse gas concentrations
Projections of temperature changes 
Impacts on agriculture generated through, for example, crop 
response models
Impacts on agricultural trade investigated by linking these 
models with agricultural production, demand and trade 
models 
Table 1 outlines four sets of scenarios used widely in modelling the 
above kinds of impact, along with examples of outputs from different 
modelling studies. These results are discussed in the following 
sections which are concerned with, respectively, the physical asset 
base, access to assets, impacts on cereal production, and on trade 
and food security, and impacts on growth and poverty reduction. 
Box 1 summarises much of the discussion.
Impacts of climate change on the physical asset 
base
Modelling of environmental constraints in relation to agriculture 
starts with a current situation in which two-thirds of the global land 
surface – some 8.9 billion hectares – suffers severe constraints for 
crop cultivation: 13.2% is too cold, 26.5% is too dry, 4.6% is too steep, 
2.0% is too wet, and 19.8% has poor soils. For e.g. southern Africa 
by 2080, climate change could have made an additional 11% of the 
total land area severely constrained for crop cultivation (constraints 
were in relation to soils, terrain, cold temperatures and moisture). 
Increased carbon dioxide concentrations can have a positive impact 
on plant growth, although the effects are very uncertain (e.g. at one 
extreme the projected number of people at risk of hunger in 2080 
are at levels similar to 2000, at the other, almost twice that number). 
Increased frequency of extreme weather events could also depress 
yield by damaging crops at key growth stages (Rosenzweig et al. 
2002). However, agricultural land suitable for cereal crop cultivation 
could expand signiﬁcantly in North America (40%), northern Europe 
(16%), the Russian Federation (64%), and East Asia (10%), due to 
longer planting periods and generally more favourable growing 
conditions under warming (Fischer et al, 2005; IPCC 2007).
•
•
•
•
•
Table 1:   Impacts on cereal yields and imports, and undernourished people using four IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
IPCC Scenario A1F1 A2 B1 B2
Population in 2100 (a) 7 billion 15 billion 7 billion 10 billion
Economic growth (a) 3.5% p.a. 2% p.a. 2.75% p.a. 2% p.a.
Emission levels (a) High Medium high Low Medium low
Temperature increases (°C) (a) 2020: 0.7
2050: 1.96
2080: 3.67
2020: 0.59
2050: 1.59
2080: 2.9
2020: 0.54
2050:1.15
2080: 1.76
2020: 0.61
2050: 1.31
2080: 2.08
Cereal yields (without beneﬁcial CO2 
effects (b)
decreases 10 to 18% by 2050, 
up to 30% by 2080 in Africa 
and parts of Asia
similar to A1F1
largest contrast between developing 
and developed countries
Cereal imports in developing 
countries in 2080 (c)
430 million tonnes 170 million 
tonnes
Number of people at risk of hunger 
in 2080 with and without CO2 
fertilisation (million) (d)
136 
370
742-885 
950-1320
99-102
125
221-244
257-384 
Sources: (a) Stern, 2006; (b) Parry et al., 2004; (c) Fischer et al. 2005) (d) IPCC 2007
Note: many different models are used to process the basic scenario inputs, each using different assumptions. 
3Impacts of climate change on access to assets
The claims made by non-agricultural development on scarce land 
and water are set to increase.  These will tend to exacerbate the 
insecurity of tenure which the poor already face in relation to land 
and water resources. This trend is likely to worsen as claims on 
resources shift with e.g. the increased ﬁnancial ﬂows associated 
with mitigation instruments (CDM and emissions trading, Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), biofuels and 
voluntary carbon schemes outside Kyoto’s market mechanisms).
An appropriate balance needs to be struck between governments’ 
international mandates and the pro-poor dimensions of national 
policies. This can be done by:
⇒  Mainstreaming climate change into development policy via 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAS); and Sector Wide 
Approaches (SWAps).
⇒   Adopting a rights-based approach in order to:
o  Strengthen the negotiating position of the poor
o  Reinforce their assets base
Case studies of land tenure/management and water resources (Brown 
et al, 2007) indicate the signiﬁcant challenges that remain to pro-poor 
development, challenges which derive as much from the political 
economy of resource exploitation as from the nature of the climatic 
constraints. However, one positive message is that a rights-based 
approach, coupled with improved understanding of likely patterns 
of climate change, offers a valuable opportunity to pursue longer 
term policies than are normally evident in conventional mechanisms 
such as PRSPs and SWAps. Only when the rights of the poor are more 
fully established and acknowledged will there be some prospect 
of tailoring the impacts of climate change to the wider beneﬁt by 
‘mainstreaming’ it within development policy. This is also likely to 
enhance the capacity of communities to cope through more robust 
‘adaptation’ options, as well as addressing the wider international 
interests that are likely to arise with increasing international 
investment in climate change adaptation and mitigation.
Impacts of climate change on global cereal 
production
Fischer et al (2005) project that global cereal production could 
continue to increase up to 3.7-4.8bn tonnes by 2080 without 
climate change.  When it is factored in, global cereal production 
could be within 2% of  reference scenarios, but with potentially 
large regional variations. In general, decreases are expected in 
low latitudes and developing countries, reﬂecting both declining 
potential land available for crop cultivation reported above and 
changes in productivity. Sub-regional variations are masked by 
these ﬁgures, with some short term increases possible in areas of 
overall decrease (e.g. Africa).  For example, in tropical highlands 
where current low temperatures prevent planting of certain crops, 
new land could become suitable for agriculture.
Prices and agricultural GDP
At high degrees of warming (>5°C) some models project price 
increases of up to 30% on average, though most projections are 
generally more modest, and in the short and medium term real 
prices could fall owing to higher outputs from slight temperature 
increases. Also, the impacts of climate change on agricultural GDP 
until 2080 are likely to be small at global level, and range between 
-1.5 to +2.6%, depending on the scenario, but with decreases in 
most developing regions (Fischer et al., 2002).
Impacts on trade
Simulations based on the SRES scenarios outlined above project an 
approximate 25% increase in developing countries’ net cereal imports, 
totalling between 170 million tonnes and 430 million tonnes in 2080, 
depending on the scenario (Fischer et al 2005; Parry et al 2004). 
Some support within developing countries to sustainable resource 
management may make soil and water more resilient against 
climate change impacts and so help towards diversiﬁcation. Public 
expenditure on agricultural research and advisory services, market 
development, and rural infrastructure can be shifted in favour of 
small farm export promotion. Help in diversifying out of agriculture, 
and more social protection, will be necessary in those areas, or for 
those farms, without successful farming futures.
The private sector potentially also offers new market opportunities, 
for example through carbon trading, the value of which could exceed 
ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA). Donors can help to build 
Box 1:  Six things we know about the science of climate 
change and agriculture
• There is high uncertainty in projections of impacts on 
agriculture, due to the global nature of models, ‘scaling’ 
problems in linking global models to local crop models and 
the large impact that the basic socio-economic scenario 
assumptions have on outcome of the models.
• Yield changes are expected due to climate change, but with 
complex relationships among the effects of CO2 fertilisation, 
temperature, type of crop and impacts of extreme events on key 
stages in the growth cycle of plants. The CO2 fertilisation effect, 
in particular, can have a very large impact on crop yields.
• Potential agricultural land available for agriculture is likely 
to increase at high latitudes and decrease at low latitudes.
• Related to this, most models project that tropical developing 
countries (especially Africa) will increase cereal imports from 
developed countries and temperate areas by the 2080s.  
• Extreme events such as ﬂoods and droughts are likely to 
become more severe and frequent over the next century 
under all scenarios and for most land areas.
• Cereal price changes are generally modest under all but the 
most extreme scenarios.
Figure 1: Change in cereal production in developed and 
developing countries for a doubling of CO2 levels 
Note:  Percentage changes for a 3°C  warming in the three models used, 
are relative to what they would have been without climate change.  
Assumptions: mostly farm level adaptation; some economy wide 
adaptation; strong CO2 fertilisation effect.  
Source: Stern 2006
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developing country capacity in international carbon negotiations 
as well as helping them to support both regulated and voluntary 
carbon markets. 
Trade will impact on poverty by:
altering the total supply of food within a country (from the 
combined effects of changes to domestic supply, to the volume 
of exports and to the relative price of imports and exports);
altering the balance of production between those currently 
net producers and those who are net consumers, between 
those producing for the domestic market and for export, and 
between those who source their consumption domestically or 
from imports;
altering the structure of production between small and large 
farmers and between landed and landless labour.
Specific technical features of production will influence how 
agricultural production and trade evolve under climate change. But 
it is possible to identify policies – both national and international 
– that would tend to facilitate a particular outcome or the reverse. 
Table 2 illustrates these for sub-Saharan Africa. A third scenario 
– the expansion of labour-intensive exports, which offers the best 
prospects for poverty reduction – would be achieved by avoiding 
everything in column 2 and undertaking everything in column 3.
Impacts on food security
Climate change may slow rates of improvement in food security, 
although the projections are highly uncertain due to limitations in the 
number of crop and economic models available and simpliﬁcation of 
the deﬁnition of food security to food availability. It is projected that 
in 2080 around 1300 million people (around 600 million more than 
1999) could be at risk of hunger under the most extreme scenarios 
(Parry et al 2004), with the poorest countries worse affected. In these, 
a large portion of the population will continue to depend on agriculture 
and capacities to adapt to climate change (e.g. technologies, ﬁnances, 
investments, etc.), both at national and farm level are lowest. Within 
sub-Saharan Africa the negative impacts are likely to be strongest 
in north and south, possibly with some positive impacts in central 
African countries.  General modelling studies on food security rarely 
consider how it could be disrupted by more extreme weather events. 
Under more moderate scenarios, climate change appears to have a 
negligible effect on the numbers of people at risk of hunger.
•
•
•
Climate change, growth and poverty reduction
Against a resurgence of donor interest in the contribution of 
agricultural growth to poverty reduction, there are three critical areas 
of debate, yet concerns over climate change have been articulated 
into these only to a limited extent:
Are optimal combinations of growth and poverty 
reduction more likely to come from small rather than 
large farms?  
One emerging view is that small farms have proven to be “good 
adapters” by e.g. responding to weather as crops are planted 
and mature. But they cannot adapt in the longer-term unless they 
can access micro-insurance, credit, new technology and market 
information.  In reality, larger farmers are better able to take risks, 
and to support small farmer adaptation through longer-term policies 
is likely to be difﬁcult.
Will a focus on cash or food crops offer the best 
prospects for growth and poverty reduction?  
The evidence is scant, but, where cash crops are perennial, producers 
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to adapt. To reduce risk, food crop producers adapt by 
diversifying their range of crops, switching to drought-resistant crops 
and possibly even withdrawing from markets.  Carbon sequestration 
may generate new “cash crop” opportunities – i.e. selling for income 
from carbon markets, as may crops for generating biofuels.  This may 
imply a shift towards tree crops and/or agroforestry, or possibly new 
cropping systems, such as reduced tillage.
Will investments in high or low potential areas offer 
the best prospects for growth and poverty reduction in 
agriculture?  
The prevalent view is that low potential areas are highly vulnerable to 
climate change and signiﬁcant investments will be needed to maintain 
production there.  An alternative to this type of investment is to support 
diversiﬁcation into the rural non-farm economy and/or to enable 
outmigration.  In some zones, high potential areas which are double 
or triple cropped will be most under threat.  Where food security or 
export earnings are threatened, governments may choose to protect 
these high potential areas rather than invest in marginal areas.
Table 2: Policies relating to production/trade scenarios 
Scenario Policies making this scenario more likely Policies making a better outcome more likely
1. Export 
agriculture 
declines
• Neglect of “climate change proofing” 
technology for export agriculture;
• Transport and related policies that discriminate 
against sub-Saharan African transport 
modes;
• Subsidies to domestic producers;
• Restrictions on global trade in biofuels.
• Early shift in emphasis for technical support from doomed 
crops to more climate change-proof ones;
• Tackling the (large) domestic footprint of food consumption 
before the (small) external one;
• Taxes on domestic use of climate change-adverse inputs 
(e.g. artiﬁcial fertilisers);
• Removal of all import restrictions (and subsidies limited 
to domestic suppliers) of biofuels.
2. Capital-
intensive 
(hi-tech) 
agricultural 
exports 
increase
• Failure of public provision of support for 
smallholders and labour-intensive, climate-
change-proof production methods;
• SPS and other regulations that are more 
difﬁcult for smallholders to meet.
• Early and marked shift in public support to R&D, extension, 
market development, rural infrastructure and services so 
as to beneﬁt directly smaller farmers able to produce for 
export.
Source:  Ludi et al 2007
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Knowledge gaps 
There are large uncertainties in current projections. These result 
from gaps in the science of climate change, in uncertainties over crop 
responses, in complex socio-economic relationships and in the lack of 
detail in current models. For instance, in relation to rainfall prediction 
in Africa, there are several things we do not know which are important 
for agriculture, including the time of onset of seasonal rainfall and the 
prevalence of dry spells within seasons. Even in 15 years’ time, models 
are unlikely to be able to project the impacts of climate change at 
scales of less than 50km. If this is the case, policymakers might best 
proceed via more ‘ﬂexible’ policy approaches to cope with increased 
uncertainty about possible futures. 
Conclusions
Shock events driven by climate chance are likely to start occurring 
in the near term and will require increased disaster preparedness as 
well as increased ﬂexibility in e.g. trade policies. At a global scale, 
more gradual impacts on yields are unlikely to be felt – if at all – for 
several decades. This allows time for agriculture-focused policies 
to adapt. 
Thus, in places where climate change will mean new markets and 
productive opportunities, to increase productivity now and make 
small farmers more efﬁcient will place them on a strong footing to 
take advantage of climate change.  
Elsewhere, climate change may provide a short-term window 
of opportunity for speciﬁc activities in the agricultural sector (for 
example making the most of regional and domestic grain trade 
opportunities whilst they still exist).
Most importantly, countries that have both diversiﬁed economies 
and strong agricultural sectors will fare better under climate change 
scenarios.  Thus, development assistance for the next few decades 
should be focused on investing in countries in the earliest stages 
of development. Getting an enabling environment in place, getting 
markets working, putting social protection in place, and strengthening 
R&D will enable the agriculture sector and agricultural livelihoods to 
be more resilient, as well as stimulating wider economic growth.
There is a need for improved coordination between climate change 
modellers, agricultural economists and agricultural policy-makers, in 
order to integrate issues of climate change into existing agricultural 
policies and programmes.  
In the future, there will be a need to incorporate agricultural 
practices into mitigation policies and programmes such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).  This will lead to measurement of 
the carbon balances of both agricultural and wider development 
activities and the search for synergies between mitigation and 
adaptation in the agriculture sector.
Table 3: Climate change and the challenges to increasing productivity in agriculture
Challenge Possible Impact of Climate Change
Natural resources • In semi-arid and arid developing world, precipitation 
highly variable
• Irrigation: Water critical to increasing productivity in Asia 
but opportunities are far more limited in Africa, where 
agriculture will rely heavily on rain-fed systems in the 
future.
• Degradation of the natural resource base
• Increased variability of precipitation
• Increased competition for water, particularly between 
productive agriculture utilisation and domestic / non-
agricultural use.  Agriculture will have to use less water 
and / or irrigate far more efﬁciently. 
• Increased degradation, especially in Africa
Population • Agricultural development limited where low population 
densities and small markets
• HIV/AIDS reducing agricultural productivity in agriculture 
(Slater and Wiggins, 2005)
• Increased migration and changing population densities 
in different parts of the world - changing markets
• Adaptation hindered as coping / adaptive strategies and 
local knowledge not passed between generations
Transportation / 
Infrastructure
• Poor transport infrastructure limits market access for 
many farmers (Dorward and Kydd, 2003).
• Transport costs account for high proportion of export 
costs in many African countries (von Braun et al 2002)
• Infrastructure threatened by disasters e.g. ﬂoods.
• Transport costs likely to rise as a result of (shipping and 
airfreight) mitigation measures – implications for global 
and local competitiveness
Commodity prices • Commodity prices have fallen steady since the 1960s 
(UNCTAD 2003)
• Volatility of input and output prices discourages investment 
in increasing productivity (World Bank 2006)
• Global prices for commodities may increase but there 
will be signiﬁcant inter-regional differences
• Volatility of prices will increase under climate change 
scenarios
Access to markets • Product standards imposed by supermarkets are a 
barrier to market entry by small producers (Page and 
Slater 2003)
• High value cash crops (e.g. horticulture and ﬂoriculture) 
provide opportunities for growth though small farmers 
receive small share of market value
• Phytosanitary standards may increase due to concerns 
about new disease corridors resulting from climate 
change
• Changing consumption patterns and increased transport 
costs reduce access to supermarkets in developed 
countries
Agriculture 
growth linkages
• Links between agriculture and wider growth may not be 
as strong today as during the Green Revolution (Ellis et 
al 2000)
• Increased costs of global shipping and changing 
consumer demands regarding food miles may stimulate 
local diversiﬁcation and linkages
Role of the state • In many developing countries, ﬁscal unsustainability has 
forced states to reduce / withdraw support to agriculture 
with only rarely successful private substitution.
• Public expenditure on agriculture has fallen over the 
last 3-4 decades, especially in research  (e.g. Fan et al 
2004)
• Climate change suggests an increased role for the state 
to ensure successful adaptation and mitigation but 
whether this will result in a rejuvenation of Ministries 
of Agriculture or ‘more of the same’ is not clear
• Different and increased public expenditure in agriculture 
is required under climate change scenarios.
Source: Slater 2007
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At the international level, the proportion of funds 
available to agriculture in new funding mechanisms 
created to address climate change is unclear. Speciﬁc 
funding for agricultural adaptation needs to be 
identiﬁed and if necessary earmarked for access by 
developing countries. There are strong arguments 
for targeting funds for adaptation towards areas that 
promote the development of a viable agricultural 
export sector.
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